Experts Urge Trump to Ban Iran Plutonium Path in Nuclear Deal

Nuclear weapons experts warn that the Trump administration must include a ban on Iran's plutonium efforts in any new nuclear deal to prevent atomic bomb development.

The administration and non-proliferation specialists have concentrated on Iran's uranium-based nuclear facilities. Tehran could exploit this gap to produce a plutonium bomb in secret.

Jason Brodsky, policy director at United Against Nuclear Iran, told Fox News Digital: "I do believe any proposed deal with Iran needs to address the plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons. Israel struck the Arak heavy water reactor twice over the last year — in June 2025 and in March 2026. Intelligence suggested Iran had repeatedly attempted to reconstruct the facility even after the bombing, so any deal with Iran should cover the plutonium pathway."

Iran's regime could extract plutonium from spent fuel at the Bushehr nuclear reactor for a weapon, said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense from 1989 to 1993.

In a Real Clear Defense article last month, Sokolski wrote that "Washington should make sure that Iran doesn’t remove Bushehr’s spent fuel and strip out the plutonium. This can and should be done without bombing the plant."

He added that "the Pentagon should watch to make sure Iran does not remove any of the spent fuel at Bushehr. It could do this with space surveillance assets or, as it did in 2012, with drones. Second, any ‘peace’ deal President Trump cuts with Tehran should include a requirement that there be near-real-time monitoring of the Bushehr reactor and spent fuel pond, much as the IAEA had in place with Iran’s fuel enrichment activities."

In an April Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists piece, Sokolski stated Iran has enough plutonium for more than 200 nuclear bombs. He noted, "The last time IAEA inspectors visited Bushehr was August 27, 2025. Even when agency inspectors had routine access to the plant, they only visited every 90 days — more than enough time to divert the spent fuel and possibly fashion it into nuclear weapons."

Sokolski said, "President Obama did not insist on such surveillance even though the IAEA asked Iran to permit it. Tehran said no."

Recent IAEA reports do not detail the plutonium path to a bomb.

A State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital, "Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to the United States and the entire world."

The spokesperson added, "Iran today stands in breach of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations by failing to provide full cooperation with the IAEA. Iran’s leadership must engage in serious diplomatic negotiations with the United States to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all."

David Albright, physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, told Fox News Digital he is "highly skeptical that Iran would use plutonium from Bushehr’s spent fuel to make nuclear weapons."

The former weapons inspector said, "One, Iran would need a design it has not developed. There is nothing in the Nuclear Archive on a plutonium-based nuclear weapon. Two, a diversion from Bushehr would be detected and undoubtedly lead Russia to suspend enriched uranium supplies, leading to a shutdown of a multibillion-dollar investment that supplies the area with electricity. Third, almost all the plutonium in the spent fuel is reactor-grade, and it is feasible that none is weapon-grade."

Albright noted, "Reactor-grade plutonium can be used to make a nuclear weapon, but it is tricky to do so if a significant explosive yield is wanted." He said Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton "has been raising this issue for decades, and it is a remote possibility. It was rejected first in the Bush administration."

Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program, told Fox News Digital, "The United States must insist on a permanent and verified ban on plutonium reprocessing in Iran under any deal."

Stricker said Moscow recognized the risk. "To Russia’s rare credit, it insisted Iran let inspectors back in to safeguard the Bushehr reactor after the June 2025 strikes. Those inspections resumed last August. Plutonium produced at the reactor is not of desirable quality for nuclear weapons, and Iran has not focused on the plutonium route to nuclear weapons since the early 2000s, so it could be difficult for Tehran to work with. They would also need to illicitly acquire and outfit a plutonium reprocessing plant as well as sophisticated equipment to handle and chemically convert the fuel. All of this creates significant obstacles to its use as fuel for nuclear weapons."